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Abstract: We identify the dynamic causal effects of interest rate floor shocks, exploiting regular
auctions of Swiss central bank debt securities (SNB Bills). A theoretical model shows that variation
in the volume of, and yield on, central bank debt changes the interest rate floor. In addition, the
model establishes the equivalence between central bank debt and interest-bearing reserves when
reserves are ample. Based on these insights, the empirical analysis identifies an interest rate floor
shock in a dynamic event study of SNB Bill auctions. A restrictive interest rate floor shock causes
an increase in the money market rate, a persistent appreciation of the Swiss franc, a decline in
long-term interest rates, and a decline in stock prices. We then perform policy experiments under
various identifying assumptions in which the central bank raises the interest rate floor from 0% to
0.25%. Such a policy change causes a 3-6% appreciation of the Swiss franc and a 5-20% decline in
stock prices.
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1 Introduction
Central banks massively expanded the monetary base in the wake of the financial and sovereign
debt crises. How to raise money market rates in such an environment has since become a central
question. The Federal Reserve Bank, for example, decided to pay interest on reserves to control the
Federal Funds Rate in a floor system. Empirical evidence on the impact of interest rate floors is
scarce, however, because changes in interest on reserves are rare and endogenous to the state of the
economy.1 This paper proposes to identify random variation in the interest rate floor using auctions
of interest-bearing central bank debt securities.2
We use a money market model in the spirit of Poole (1968) and Boutros and Witmer (forthcoming)
to show that central bank debt securities may generate variation in the interest rate floor. We
find that the volume of central bank debt affects the money market rate for two reasons. First,
issuing debt securities absorbs reserves and increases the likelihood of a costly liquidity shortage
(reserve-absorbing channel). Second, a greater supply of debt securities reduces the cost of holding
reserves because a greater share of non-interest bearing reserves can be invested in interest-bearing
central bank debt (cost channel). With ample reserves, the probability of a liquidity shortage is close
to zero and the reserve-absorbing channel is negligible. In this case, the volume of, and yield on,
debt securities jointly determine the interest rate floor. Another way to implement an interest rate
floor is paying interest on reserves. If appropriately scaled, interest on reserve policies and debt
security programs yield the same interest rate floor. Therefore, analyzing random variation in the
main parameters of a central bank debt security program provides evidence on the effects of random
variation in interest on reserves.
The empirical analysis exploits a novel daily data set of SNB Bill auctions to identify the dynamic
causal effects of an interest rate floor shock. From 2008 to 2011, the Swiss National Bank (SNB)
auctioned debt securities on a pre-determined weekly schedule to soak up reserves created in
emergency liquidity provisions and foreign exchange interventions. We propose to estimate
dynamic causal effects combining identification through heteroscedasticity (Rigobon 2003) with local
projections or vector autoregressions (Jorda` 2005; Stock and Watson 2018; Lu¨tkepohl 2012; Lu¨tkepohl
et al. 2018). A restrictive interest rate floor shock causes an increase in the money market rate, a
persistent appreciation of the Swiss franc, a decline in stock prices, and a decline in long-term interest
rates. One interpretation of the decline in long-term interest rates is that markets expected money
market rates to remain persistently low because of the restrictive impact of the appreciation. In
addition, we perform policy experiments in which the central bank raises the interest rate floor from
1To this day, the Federal Reserve raised the interest on reserves only nine times.
2Central bank debt securities are widely used. The IMF survey on Information System for Instruments of Monetary
Policy (ISIMP) covers 125 countries. Of these countries, about 35% issue central bank debt securities (Gray and Pongsaparn
2015). About 75% of the countries have legal provisions to emit central bank debt securities.
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0% to 0.25%. The point estimates of two alternative identification schemes suggest an appreciation
between 3% and 6% and a decline in stock prices between 5% and 20%.3
The paper contributes to research analyzing exit strategies with money market models.4 Most
studies focus on interest on reserve policies. Berentsen et al. (2018) is one exception investigating the
welfare implications of central bank debt.5 In line with our findings they show that debt securities
determine an interest rate floor if reserves are ample. Our paper uses a different model to discuss the
equivalence between debt securities and interest-bearing reserves. Debt securities raise the money
market rate because the volume of, and yield on, debt securities reduce the cost of holding reserves.
Therefore, we identify a cost channel, which is also present when paying interest on reserves (see
Ireland 2014).6
In addition, the paper is related to a literature using event studies to estimate the causal effects of
monetary policy.7 We propose an approach tailored to the characteristics of the SNB Bills program.
We lack information on the exact timing of the SNB Bill auctions and the exact timing of the release of
the auction results. Therefore, we cannot use changes in interest rate futures in a narrow time window
to identify the surprise component of an event as in Kuttner (2001), Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005), Gertler
and Karadi (2015), and Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a). Instead, we follow Rigobon (2003) and
exploit changes in the variance of economic data during deterministic regime changes (see Rigobon
and Sack 2004; Gu¨rkaynak et al. 2018; Nakamura and Steinsson 2018a; Cieslak and Schrimpf 2019, for
monetary policy applications).8 We measure the effect of an interest rate floor shock by comparing
the variance of financial market variables on an auction day to the variance on a day without an
auction. Because we do not want to restrict the response of the money market rate, our strategy
imposes that a restrictive interest rate floor shock causes a decline in stock market prices (similar to
3These findings are in line with Ba¨urle and Kaufmann (2018) who estimate impulse responses to a contractionary risk
premium shock in Switzerland before the financial crisis as well as from January 2010 to July 2011. They find that risk
premium shocks have a more persistent impact on the exchange rate and prices in the second period during which the
effective lower bound was binding. Our paper shows that the SNB Bills program influenced this effective lower bound.
4Methodologically, our model closely follows Boutros and Witmer (forthcoming). They add an option for commercial
banks to exchange central bank reserves for cash to analyze the implementation of policy rates below the yield on cash.
Bech and Keister (2017) propose a related model to study liquidity cover ratios.
5Other papers on central bank debt securities focus on conceptual and operational issues (see e.g. Dziobek and Dalton
2005; Nyawata 2012; Gray and Pongsaparn 2015). These papers discuss eligibility of central bank debt as collateral in
repurchase operations, treatment for capital requirements, liquidity of marketable central bank debt, coordination of debt
management and monetary operations, possible threats to balance sheets of central banks (losses and recapitalization), and
coordination of emissions with the treasury.
6Therefore, many insights from the literature on interest on reserves resonate well with our findings (e.g. Ennis 2018;
Bech and Klee 2011; Keister et al. 2008; Goodfriend 2002). There are some differences, however. Keister et al. (2008)
establish that paying interest on reserves “divorces” money from monetary policy in that reserve-absorbing or -providing
operations have no impact on money market rates if reserves are ample. In contrast, issuing reserve-absorbing debt
securities mechanically affects the costs of holding reserves. Thus, with debt securities, the divorce between monetary
policy and money is incomplete.
7See Gu¨rkaynak and Wright (2013) for an overview on event studies. More generally, our paper is related to a literature
identifying the causal impact of monetary policy (see Nakamura and Steinsson 2018b, for a survey).
8As Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a) show this comes at the cost of a less efficient estimator because financial market
variables are influenced by substantial background noise unrelated to the monetary policy decision.
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Jarocin´ski and Karadi 2018).9
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the purpose and main
characteristics of the SNB’s debt security program. Section 3 incorporates central bank debt in a
money market model to study its impact on interest rates. Section 4 presents the estimation and
identification strategy before we discuss the empirical findings in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 The SNB Bills program
From October 2008 to July 2011, the SNB used debt securities to absorb reserves from the banking
system. The SNB issued 232 Bills on 167 auction days.10 Most SNB Bills had a short time to maturity
from 7 to 85 days; some of them had a term to maturity up to one year.11 They were denominated in
Swiss francs.
The auctions usually took place on a specific day of the week from 2pm to 2:30pm and the results
were published in the afternoon. Several days before an auction, the SNB announced the auction day,
a price range for valid bids, the term of the Bills, and the payment date.12 Bills were then allotted in
American auctions with a variable rate tender. Each participant submitted the amount of Bills he or
she was willing to accept jointly with a price. The SNB then chose the marginal price above which
participants’ offers were satisfied. Thereafter, participants paid the price they offered in their bids.
The transactions were usually settled two working days after the auction.
SNB Bills were bought by a broad range of counterparties. Buyers either had reserve accounts at the
SNB, access to the CH Repo Market, or access to the OTC Spot Market of the SIX Exchange (see SNB
2016).13 The SNB has a relatively broad access policy to its facilities, including domestic securities
brokers/dealers, insurance companies, asset managers of collective investment schemes, as well as
foreign banks.14 Participants in the CH Repo Market largely coincide with banks having access to
the SNB’s facilities and reserve accounts.15 SNB Bills therefore reduced the volume of reserves and
9Most studies measuring the impact of monetary policy shocks on the economy implicitly identify the sign of the
response assuming that a restrictive monetary policy shock is associated with an increase in a money market rate. Because
we aim to test whether an SNB Bill auction raises interest rates, we avoid this assumption.
10Our source is publicly accessible information on SNB Bill auctions (see Appendix A).
11Sometimes, the SNB auctioned two Bills with different term to maturity on the same day. The term was determined in
such a way that the Bills matured on a day with a new auction.
12This information stems from a small number of announcement forms stored on a web archive. We cannot establish,
however, whether the content and release date of these announcement forms changed over time.
13SNB Bills were transferable and traded on the SIX Exchange. Parties without access to SNB’s facilities could therefore
purchase SNB Bills too, but only through a counterparty eligible to participate in an SNB Bill auction. In addition, given
the large denomination of the Bills of CHF 1 million, SNB Bill holders were likely large firms or institutional investors.
14Kraenzlin and Nellen (2015) report that in December 2010, 62 of 170 participants in the CH Repo Market were located
abroad, most of them in Austria (24), Germany (16), and in the UK (6). See https://www.six-group.com/repo/dam/
downloads/publications/repo-participant-list.pdf for a list of participants.
15According to Kraenzlin and Nellen (2015): “As a rule of thumb, banks that have access to the Swiss repo system are
also eligible to participate in the SNB’s open market operations and have access to the SNB’s standing facilities.”
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the monetary base.16
Figure 1 — Liabilities of the SNB
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Notes: Panel (a) shows the daily volume of outstanding CHF SNB Bills and average weekly reserves of domestic banks
(not accounting for repurchases of SNB Bills). Panel (b) shows monthly liabilities of the SNB (accounting for repurchases
of SNB Bills). Sight liabilities comprise reserves of domestic, as well as foreign banks, and the Swiss government. SNB Bills
comprise denominations in USD and CHF.
Figure 1 panel (a) shows that SNB Bills indeed absorbed reserves from the banking system. In early
2010 reserves rose quickly because of foreign exchange interventions.17 Thereafter, the SNB stepped
up its SNB Bills program, which led to a strong decline in domestic bank reserves. Conversely, when
the SNB decided to expand reserves in August 2011, the amount of outstanding Bills fell strongly.
SNB Bills were the main tool to drain reserves. Panel (b) shows monthly values of total reserves,
including accounts of domestic and foreign counterparties, as well as the Swiss government. SNB
Bills accounted for more than 40% of total SNB liabilities in 2011, making up more than 17% of Swiss
nominal GDP. The SNB also drained reserves with reverse repurchase agreements (reverse repo).
These were less important than SNB Bills, however (10% of total liabilities).
Why did the SNB issue debt securities?18 Our interpretation is that the SNB aimed to keep the 3M
Libor from falling to zero amid its liquidity-providing operations during the financial and sovereign
16Conversely, the program enabled the SNB to quickly increase reserves. It could either repurchase outstanding SNB Bills
in open market operations or stop renewing SNB Bills that fell due. According to Moser (2012) no repurchases occurred
before the SNB stopped issuing debt securities in August 2011.
17Foreign currency investments rose from CHF 95 billion in December 2009 to CHF 225 billion in June 2010. See https:
//data.snb.ch/en/topics/snb#!/cube/snbbipo.
18The literature stresses two main purposes to issue central bank debt in advanced economies. First, central banks
finance particular operations with debt securities (see e.g. Rule 2011; SNB 2009b). For example, the Bank of England emits
debt securities in foreign currency to finance its foreign exchange reserves. The central banks of Malaysia and Switzerland
issued foreign currency debt to finance subsidiaries supporting troubled commercial banks during the Asian crisis and the
2008 financial crisis, respectively (see Rule 2011; SNB 2009b). Second, industrialized countries have started to consider and
employ central bank debt securities to drain reserves (Nyawata 2012). Speeches by members of the governing board in 2009
suggest that the SNB may use debt securities to tighten monetary policy in the future. For example, according to Jordan
(2009): “SNB Bills will play an important role in the transition from the current zero interest rate environment towards
a traditional interest rate policy.” (our translation). Developing economies frequently use central bank debt securities to
sterilize foreign exchange interventions.
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debt crises. As long as the 3M Libor remained close to target, policy makers could communicate
that the emergency liquidity provisions and foreign exchange interventions had no impact on the
monetary policy stance. In fact, the SNB announced on 15 October 2008 that SNB Bills “[. . . ] will
serve to absorb liquidity, thereby neutralizing the monetary policy impact of measures to inject
liquidity.” (SNB 2008b).19
Figure 2 panel (a) presents the evolution of the 3M Libor, the 3M SAR, and the marginal SNB Bill rate.
The 3M SAR is a secured money market rate based on actual repo transactions and binding quotes.
We construct the marginal rate by averaging the marginal yield of SNB Bills weighted by the volume
outstanding.20 In 2008 the SNB engaged in emergency liquidity provisions after the bankruptcy
of Lehman Brothers when “tensions in international money markets [led] to upward pressure on
short-term Swiss franc money market rates” (SNB 2008a). While the SNB was willing to reduce risk
premia on money market rates it wanted to avoid a decline of the 3M Libor below target. Indeed,
the marginal SNB Bill yield remained close to the 3M SAR. This is suggestive evidence that SNB Bills
helped to keep riskless money market rates and the 3M Libor from falling below target.
Figure 2 — Marginal rate and maturity of SNB Bills
(a) Marginal rate and money market rates
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Notes: Panel (a) shows the marginal rate, calculated by averaging the marginal yield weighted by the volume outstanding.
The 3M Libor is the SNB’s operational target. The 3M SAR (Swiss Average Rate) is a three-month interest rate based on
actual repo transactions and binding quotes. Panel (b) shows the daily volume of outstanding CHF SNB Bills according to
term to maturity of approximately one month and less, 3 months, 6 months, and 12 months. Both figures do not account
for repurchases of SNB Bills. Therefore, we do not show the marginal SNB Bill yield after August 2011 in panel (a).
We observe a similar co-movement of the 3M Libor, the 3M SAR, and the marginal SNB Bill rate
in 2010, after the SNB conducted substantial exchange rate interventions. Arguably, without any
further action, the 3M Libor would have fallen to zero because of the increase in reserves. To keep
19Policy makers viewed the program as irrelevant for the stance of monetary policy as long as commercial banks held
substantial reserves. Moser (2011): “From a monetary policy perspective, liquidity draining operations are negligible, as
long as commercial banks hold excess liquidity and interest rates are close to zero.” (our translation).
20The marginal rate does not account for repurchases of SNB Bills. Therefore, we do not show the marginal rate after
August 2011.
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the 3M Libor close to its point target at 0.25% the SNB increased the supply of SNB Bills. In addition,
the SNB started to issue Bills with a higher marginal yield and a longer term to maturity (see panels
a and b). The rise in all three interest rates coincides with the change in the SNB Bills program.21
Indeed, policy makers suggested that they managed to bring the 3M Libor up to 0.2%. To move it
closer to 0.25%, however, they would have had to absorb even more reserves (see Moser 2011).
3 Central bank debt in a money market model
We develop a money market model closely related to Poole (1968) and Boutros and Witmer
(forthcoming) to show that central bank debt securities determine an interest rate floor for the money
market rate.22
3.1 Agents
We assume a continuum of commercial banks on the interval i ∈ [0, 1]. Each commercial bank holds
an exogenous amount of pre-determined reservesRi > 0, manages an exogenous amount of deposits
D ≥ Ri, and experiences a zero-mean liquidity shock Z ≤ D, where Z > 0 is a liquidity outflow.23
Assets Ai are residually determined by Ri and D, assuming commercial banks’ capital to be zero
(see Figure 3). A commercial bank borrows additional reserves Bi from the money market at the net
money market rate im.24 Reserves bear no interest, deposits cost id, and assets earn ia.
Commercial bank i invests a fraction pii of its pre-auction reserves (Fi ≡ Bi +Ri) in central bank debt
securities.25 After the debt security settlement, commercial bank i holds (1 − pii)Fi in post-auction
reserves. Thus, the commercial bank has a buffer of Ei ≡ (1− pii)Fi −K to absorb potential liquidity
outflows, where K is the exogenous minimum reserve requirement. If a commercial bank faces a
liquidity shortage, it has to borrow at the central bank’s discount window. The amount of reserves
that a commercial bank borrows at the discount window is Xi ≡ max(0, Zi − Ei).
The central bank provides reserves (R =
∫ 1
0 Ridi) and runs a discount window facility at which
commercial banks can borrow an unlimited amount of additional reserves at the exogenous discount
21Another episode supporting this interpretation occurred in Summer 2011, when the Swiss franc had appreciated by
more than 25%. On 3 August 2011, the SNB announced to lower the 3M Libor to as close as possible to 0%. In addition,
the SNB expanded reserves from CHF 30 billion to CHF 80 billion, and, shortly afterwards, to CHF 200 billion (see SNB
2011c,a,b; Christensen and Krogstrup forthcoming). Therefore, the SNB stopped issuing new SNB Bills and bought back
outstanding Bills. The SNB Bills program effectively ended on this day.
22We follow Afonso and Lagos (2015), Bech and Monnet (2016), and Bech and Keister (2017) who use similar models to
analyze the implementation of monetary policy and the properties of money markets.
23For tractability, we assume that commercial banks do not differ in terms of D and K.
24Negative money market borrowing, that is money market lending, is constrained by the amount of available reserves
(−Bi ≤ Ri).
25Our concept of pre-auction reserves is closely related to what Gagnon and Sack (2014) call “Fed liquidity”, that is, the
sum of reserves and overnight reverse repurchase agreements. In our paper, pre-auction reserves are the sum of reserves
and central bank debt securities, as illustrated in Figure 3. We use the term pre-auction reserves because, in reality, the SNB
used auctions to issue Bills. For the exact timing of the model, see Section 3.2.
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Figure 3 — Stylized commercial bank balance sheet
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Notes: Fi: pre-auction reserves; (1−pii)Fi: post-auction reserves; piiFi: commercial bank i’s investment in central bank debt
securities; Ri: pre-determined reserves; Ai: other assets; D: deposits. The commercial bank borrows additional reserves
on the money market in this example (Bi > 0). In equilibrium, aggregated money market borrowing must be zero.
window rate ix. Beyond that, the central bank has two levers to affect the money market rate. First,
the central bank decides over the maximum fraction of pre-auction reserves that each commercial
bank can invest in debt securities (picb ∈ [0, 1]). Second, the central bank determines the yield on debt
securities (0 ≤ ib ≤ ix).26
3.2 Timing
We assume a standard timing convention (see e.g. Boutros and Witmer forthcoming). First, the
central bank determines the volume of, and yield on, debt securities (picb and ib). Second, commercial
banks decide on the optimal amount of money market borrowing (Bi) and the optimal amount of
debt securities (pii ∈ [0, picb]). These two decisions pin down the commercial banks’ money demand
functions. Third, commercial banks engage in the money market. At this stage, we impose the market
clearing condition (
∫
iBidi = 0). Fourth, central bank debt securities are settled and each commercial
bank holds post-auction reserves ((1 − pii)Fi) and debt securities (piiFi). Fifth, the liquidity shock
materializes.27 Sixth, a commercial bank borrows at the central bank’s discount window if it faces a
liquidity shortage (i.e. if Xi > 0).
26The Swiss National Bank issued debt securities in auctions. Therefore, the marginal yield depended on the bids and
vice versa. For tractability, we analyze the role of each parameter independently.
27The fact that the liquidity shock materializes after the money market closes captures imperfections on the money
market that prevent commercial banks from exactly targeting their required reserves before the closing of the money
market. The work of Bech and Monnet (2016), Afonso and Lagos (2015), and Ennis and Weinberg (2013) justifies the
simplification.
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3.3 Commercial bank problem
The commercial bank maximizes expected profits E(Πi) over the optimal amount of money market
borrowing Bi and the fraction of pre-auction reserves invested in debt securities pii.28 The expected
profit of commercial bank i is:
E(Πi) = iaAi + ibpii(Ri +Bi)− imBi − idE(D − Z)− ix
∫ ∞
zˆi
Xif(Z)dZ , (1)
where zˆi is the realization of the liquidity shock that is associated to zero borrowing at the discount
window. Reserve requirements K do not enter the commercial bank’s problem as a constraint but
only through the probability of a liquidity shortage. K is not a constraint to the expected profit
maximization problem because commercial banks can borrow at the discount window before having
to comply with reserve requirements.
Commercial banks have an incentive to hold reserves for two reasons. First, a higher stock of reserves
lowers the probability of a liquidity shortage. A lower probability of a liquidity shortage is beneficial
because, in equilibrium, the discount rate is higher than the money market rate. Second, borrowing
reserves on the money market increases the interest rate payments that commercial banks receive
from investing in debt securities.
Commercial banks trade-off the marginal benefits of borrowing on the money market (a lower
probability of a liquidity shortage and a higher interest rate income from investing in debt securities)
against the marginal costs of borrowing (the money market rate). Optimal commercial bank behavior
requires that these are equal.29
3.4 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, a money market rate im prevails at which it is beneficial for commercial banks with
a relatively scarce (ample) amount of pre-determined reserves Ri to borrow (lend) on the money
market. After the closing of the money market, each commercial bank holds the same amount of
pre-auction reserves (Fi = F ∀i) and thus faces the same probability of a liquidity shortage (P (Xi >
0) = P (X > 0) ∀i). Therefore, each bank invests the same share of pre-auction reserves in debt
securities (pii = pi ∀i).
Proposition 1 If each commercial bank maximizes expected profits with respect to Bi and pii, the money
market rate equals im = ibpi + (1− pi)ixP (X > 0), where pi = min(picb, p¯i).
28The commercial bank takes interest rates, reserve balances Ri, deposits D, asset holdings Ai, the distribution of Z, the
minimum reserve requirement K, and the supply of debt securities picb as given.
29Optimal commercial bank behavior also implies that lending on the money market is, on the margin, equally attractive
as holding a portfolio of size Fi, partly invested in central bank debt securities and partly invested in non-interest-bearing
reserves.
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Proof. See Appendix B, Section B.1.
Proposition 1 establishes the money market equilibrium that prevails if commercial banks can invest
in central bank debt securities. If the central bank does not supply debt securities, the money
market rate is strictly downward-sloping in reserves as in Poole (1968). If reserves go to infinity,
the probability of a liquidity shortage goes to zero. The money market rate then approaches the
interest rate floor. In Poole (1968) the interest rate floor is zero because, in the aggregate, non-interest
bearing reserves cannot be invested in interest-bearing assets.
In our model, the interest rate floor is strictly positive. The reason is that commercial banks can
exchange non-interest bearing reserves for interest-bearing debt securities. In addition, our model
differs from Poole (1968) in that debt securities drain reserves from the interbank market.
Commercial banks are willing to invest in debt securities up to some threshold p¯i. Accepting
an additional unit of debt securities beyond the threshold decreases expected profits through the
increased probability of a liquidity shortage. If reserves are ample, the probability of a liquidity
shortage is low. Therefore, it is beneficial for commercial banks to exchange a large share of reserves
for debt securities. In contrast, if reserves are scarce, commercial banks are not willing to absorb a
lot of debt securities. Increasing the supply of debt securities is therefore less effective if reserves are
scarce.30
Corollary 1.1 With ample reserves the floor on the money market rate is
¯
im ≡ limF→∞ im = piib.
Proof. Because limF→∞X = −∞, limF→∞ P (X > 0) = 0. The result then follows directly from
proposition 1.
Corollary 1.1 establishes that the volume of, and yield on, debt securities jointly determine a floor on
the money market rate im.31 Even with ample reserves central bank debt securities therefore allow to
raise the money market rate.
Corollary 1.2 The response of the money market rate im to an increase in the yield on debt securities ib is
dim
dib
= pi ≥ 0.
Proof. Follows immediately from proposition 1.
30See Section 3.6 for an illustration and Appendix C, Section C.1 for a technical discussion.
31The upper limit binds for sufficiently low reserves. The money market rate is constrained by an upper bound because
commercial banks would not borrow at a money market rate above the discount window rate. In fact, at sufficiently low
F , commercial banks abstain from holding any debt securities (p¯i = 0) such that the upper limit is equal to the discount
rate ix. For more details, see Appendix C, Sections C.1 and C.2.
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The money market rate strictly increases in the yield on debt securities if commercial banks are
willing to hold these securities. A higher yield lowers the cost of holding pre-auction reserves
without affecting the amount of post-auction reserves available as a liquidity buffer.32 Variation
in the yield on debt securities therefore affect the money market rate only through a cost channel.
Corollary 1.3 The response of the money market rate to an increase in the supply of debt securities is dim
dpicb
=
ib − ixP (X > 0) + (1− pi)ix ∂P (X>0)∂pi > 0 if pi < p¯i.
Proof. Follows from proposition 1 and Appendix C, Section C.1 and C.2.
The money market rate rises in the supply of debt securities as long as commercial banks’ expected
profits rise in debt security investments, that is, as long as commercial banks are non-satiated with
debt securities (pi < p¯i). Commercial banks are willing to invest a larger fraction of pre-auction
reserves in debt securities if pre-auction reserves are high.33
In sum, a higher supply of debt securities increases the money market rate through two channels.
First, the cost of holding pre-auction reserves falls because reserves can, in part, be invested in
interest-bearing debt securities. This investment opportunity translates a greater supply of debt
securities into a higher demand for pre-auction reserves (cost channel). Second, debt security
investments increase the probability of a liquidity shortage because debt securities drain reserves
(reserve-absorbing channel). The reserve-absorbing channel is negligible, however, if reserves are
ample.
3.5 Central bank debt securities and interest on reserves
To establish the equivalence between interest on reserve policies and central bank debt security
programs, we derive the money market rate iiorm that prevails if commercial banks earn positive
interest on reserves iior > 0 instead of having access to central bank debt securities.
Proposition 2 Suppose that commercial banks earn iior > 0 on reserves. If each commercial bank maximizes
expected profits with respect to Bi and pii, the money market rate equals iiorm = iior + ixP (Xior > 0), where
Xior = Z − (F −K).
Proof. See Appendix B, Section B.2.
Proposition 2 establishes the money market equilibrium that prevails if commercial banks earn a
32Equivalently, a higher yield on debt securities increases the return on a portfolio of size F , partly invested in central
bank debt securities and partly invested in non-interest-bearing reserves.
33The money market rate does not react to an increase in the supply of debt securities if commercial banks are satiated
with debt securities. For more details, see Appendix C, Section C.1.
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strictly positive interest on reserves.34 In contrast to issuing debt securities, which affects the money
market rate through the cost channel and the reserve-absorbing channel, interest on reserve policies
affect the money market rate only through the cost channel.
Corollary 2.1 With ample reserves the floor on the money market rate is
¯
iiorm ≡ limF→∞ iiorm = iior.
Proof. Because limF→∞Xior = −∞, limF→∞ P (Xior > 0) = 0. The result then follows directly from
proposition 2.
From Corollary 1.1 and 2.1, it follows that a central bank can implement an interest rate floor either
with an interest on reserves policy or with a debt security program. The interest rate floor in the two
regimes is equal if iior = ibpi. Therefore, analyzing random variation in the main parameters of a
central bank debt security program provides evidence on the money market effects of variation in
interest on reserves.
3.6 Illustration
To illustrate the qualitative features of the money market model, we calibrate its parameters to
match the situation in Switzerland in August 2010. At the time, Swiss commercial banks held
approximately CHF 10 billion as minimum reserves (K = 10). The minimum reserve requirement
was 2.5%, implyingD = 400.35 The discount rate was 0.55% (SNB 2010a). Focusing on the qualitative
predictions of the model, we assume a rather arbitrary distribution of the liquidity shockZ ∼ N(0, 4).
The marginal SNB Bill yield ranged from 0.05% to 1.25%, exceeding 0.55% only before the 3M Libor
target range fell to [0% 0.75%] in March 2009.36 At the peak of the program, SNB Bills accounted for
80% of pre-auction reserves. Consequently, we vary ib and picb between [0, ix] and [0, 1], respectively.
Pre-auction reserves reached CHF 140 billion in August 2010. For pre-auction reserves, we thus
consider values between 0 and 150 billion.37
We first discuss the impact of changing the volume of debt securities on the money market rate.
The left panel of Figure 4 shows the money market rate as a function of pre-auction reserves for
various picb conditional on ib = 0.1%. The money demand curves are strictly downward sloping in
pre-auction reserves, unless commercial banks are satiated with a positive amount of debt securities
(pi = p¯i > 0). The money market rate falls in pre-auction reserves because a greater liquidity buffer
decreases the likelihood of a liquidity shortage (the liquidity effect).
If commercial banks are satiated with a positive amount of debt securities, the money demand curves
34Many others have established a similar result, e.g. Goodfriend (2002).
35SNB (2010b) and Bundesrat (2004)
36The SNB targeted the lower end of the range at approximately 0.25% (see SNB 2009a).
37The value of ia is irrelevant for the money market rate because, in the aggregate, commercial banks cannot exchange
reserves for private assets.
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are flat in pre-auction reserves because commercial banks increase their debt security investments
if pre-auction reserves rise. Higher investments in debt securities, in turn, increase the return on
pre-auction reserves. The resulting upward pressure on the money market rate exactly offsets the
liquidity effect.38
Figure 4 — Money demand curves
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Notes: Conditional on ib = 0.10% (left panel) and picb = 0.5 (right panel).
If pre-auction reserves are abundant, the money market rate hits the interest rate floor. For example,
the interest rate floor equals 0.05% if the central bank allows commercial banks to invest up to 50% of
their pre-auction reserves in debt securities and the yield on debt securities amounts to 0.1%. If the
central bank supplies debt securities with a positive yield, the floor is strictly positive.
An increase in picb raises the money market rate if pi < p¯i through the reserve-absorbing channel and
the cost channel. Increasing the supply of debt securities decreases post-auction reserves available to
absorb liquidity shocks. Additionally, debt securities provide an attractive investment opportunity
to commercial banks, which lowers the costs of holding pre-auction reserves.
A larger supply of debt securities is ineffective in raising the money market rate if commercial banks
are satiated with debt securities (pi = p¯i). In this case, the additional supply is not absorbed. For
example, at F = 40, commercial banks optimally invest 65.9% of their pre-auction reserves in debt
securities. Thus, increasing picb from 0.7 to 0.8 does not affect the money market rate. In contrast,
increasing picb from 0.5 to 0.7 raises the money market rate in this situation.
Next, we examine the impact of changing the yield on debt securities. The right panel of Figure 4
depicts the money market rate as a function of pre-auction reserves for various yields on central
bank debt securities conditional on picb = 0.5. Similar to the previous analysis, money demand is
downward sloping if commercial banks are non-satiated with debt securities or if commercial banks
38See Appendix B, Section B.1 and Appendix C, Section C.2, for a discussion.
13
do not invest in debt securities at all (pi < p¯i or pi = 0). In contrast, if commercial banks are satiated
with a positive amount of debt securities, money demand is flat in pre-auction reserves. In addition,
if the yield on debt securities is strictly positive, the floor on the money market rate is strictly positive.
Finally, if commercial banks invest in debt securities, increasing the yield on debt securities raises the
money market rate through the cost channel independently of the level of pre-auction reserves.
4 Empirical strategy
We identify the effects of a surprise change in the interest rate floor through random variation in
SNB Bill auctions. Our theoretical model shows that the interest rate floor rises if the central bank
increases the volume of, or marginal yield on, central bank debt securities. In addition, the central
bank may reveal information about its intentions to change interest rates in the future. For example,
issuing debt securities with longer terms to maturity absorb reserves for longer and may thus reveal
that the central bank intends to keep the money market rate higher for longer.
We estimate the causal effect of an SNB Bill auction through heteroscedasticity (see Rigobon 2003;
Rigobon and Sack 2004; Nakamura and Steinsson 2018a). As Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2018) emphasize, this
strategy captures the impact of all information revealed during an event and not only the “headline”
news.39 To estimate dynamic causal effects we combine identification through heteroscedasticity
with vector autoregressions (VAR) and local projections. The two approaches have advantages and
disadvantages. Local projections are more robust with respect to model misspecification (see Jorda`
2005) and vector autoregressions are more efficient (see Stock and Watson 2018).
4.1 Model
To fix ideas, assume that the data stem from a VAR of order 1 including a stock price index (st) and
the money market rate (rt):40
yt = Φyt−1 + Ψet ,
where yt = [st rt]′, et = [e1t e2t]′ is a vector of i.i.d. structural shocks with V [e1t] = V [e2t] = 1, Φ
is a (2 × 2) matrix of autoregressive coefficients, and Ψ is a (2 × 2) matrix measuring the immediate
impact of the two structural shocks.41
Without loss of generality, assume that shock 1 occurs only in specific periods (“events”) whereas
39Event studies that control for expectations using surveys or interest rate futures may only capture part of the surprise
component (the “headline” news). Suppose we identify the surprise component of labor market releases comparing survey
expectations for the unemployment rate with the actual outcome published in the labor market report. If the report contains
additional surprising information, for example on the participation rate, on the employment rate, or on methodological
changes, we only measure part of the surprise component that affects financial variables (see Gu¨rkaynak et al. 2018).
40Appendix D discusses cases that are more general.
41The unit normalization of the variance of the structural shocks is standard in structural VAR analysis.
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shock 2 occurs in all periods. Then, the variance-covariance matrix of the one-step-ahead forecast
error (εt|t−1 = Ψet) changes during an event. Let Ωt∈E (Ωt/∈E) denote the variance-covariance matrix
of εt|t−1 during events (no events), and ψij the impact of variable i to shock j. Then, we can show
that:
Ωt∈E =
 ψ2s1 + ψ2s2 ψs1ψr1 + ψs2ψr2
˙ ψ2r1 + ψ
2
r2
 (2)
Ωt/∈E =
 ψ2s2 ψs2ψr2
˙ ψ2r2

Ω˜ = Ωt∈E − Ωt6∈E =
 ψ2s1 ψs1ψr1
˙ ψ2r1
 .
The diagonal of Ω˜ contains the squared impact coefficients of shock 1 on the stock price index and the
money market rate. Intuitively, we can pin down the (absolute) impact of the surprise component of
an event comparing the variance of financial market variables during event days to a counterfactual
variance that prevails on non-event days.
In Appendix D and the next section, we discuss all assumptions for identification in detail. At this
stage, we highlight two of them. First, we need to assume that an event indeed had an impact on
one of the variables (e.g. |ψs1| > 0). Second, we need to impose a sign restriction on this variable
(e.g. ψs1 < 0). If we impose that a restrictive SNB Bill shock causes a decline in stock prices we can
recursively compute all the responses by:
ψs1 = −
√
Ω˜11 (3)
ψr1 = Ω˜12/ψs1 ,
where Ω˜ij denotes the row i, column j element of Ω˜.42 This resembles the estimator used by Rigobon
(2003) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a).43 The main difference is that we do not associate the
response with a particular policy variable for which the response is normalized to unity. Instead,
we impose a sign restriction, which allows us to estimate the impulse responses to a one standard
deviation structural shock for all variables in the system (see Appendix D for a discussion).
Most event studies only measure the immediate impact. To estimate the dynamic causal effect we
propose a VAR and a local projection approach. If the data stem from a VAR of order 1 we can
42In our empirical application a restrictive SNB Bill shock will lead to lower stock prices, similar to Jarocin´ski and Karadi
(2018). Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a) assume that a restrictive monetary policy shock leads to higher interest rates.
43As Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a), we do not exploit all available information in the estimation. In fact, the variance
of the residual associated with variable 1 allows to independently compute ψr1. Therefore, it would be possible to derive
a more efficient GMM estimator and construct a test of the overidentifying restrictions (see Rigobon and Sack 2004).
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compute the impulse response at various horizons h as:44
 ψh,s1
ψh,r1
 = Φh
 ψs1
ψr1
 , for h = 1, . . . ,H .
Alternatively, we can estimate the impulse responses with local projections. A local projection is a
direct forecast of yt. Suppose we observe how an econometrician revises its h-step-ahead forecast
when one additional observation becomes available. We can estimate the impulse response after
h periods by comparing the variance of these forecast revisions for periods with an event, to the
variance for periods without an event. Intuitively, if the econometrician systematically revises its
forecast more strongly when an event occurs, these revisions reveal information about the causal
impact of the event. In what follows, we show how to estimate the impulse responses.
To fix ideas, assume that the data stem from a VAR of order 1 and we estimate the impulse response
for horizon h = 1. Iterating the VAR backwards and taking conditional expectations we can show
that the one- and two-step-ahead local projections are:
E[yt|yt−1] = Φyt−1
E[yt|yt−2] = Φ2yt−2 .
It follows that the one- and two-step-ahead forecast errors amount to:
yt − E[yt|yt−1] = εt|t−1 = Ψet
yt − E[yt|yt−2] = εt|t−2 = Ψet + ΦΨet−1 .
The difference between the two- and one-step-ahead forecast errors depends only on the structural
shocks in t− 1 and the impulse response after one period (Ψ1 ≡ ΦΨ):
εt|t−2 − εt|t−1 = Ψ1et−1 .
Therefore, we can use equations (2) and (3), with the variance-covariance matrices of εt|t−h−1−εt|t−h,
for periods with and without an event in t− h to estimate the impulse response for horizon h.
4.2 Identification
To identify the impulse responses to an SNB Bill shock we impose five assumptions (see also
Appendix D): (i) All parameters except the residual variances of the VAR and local projections are
constant; (ii) the variances of the structural shocks are unity; (iii) SNB Bill auctions affect stock prices
44Appendix D gives the formulas for a VAR of order p.
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(Ω˜11 > 0); (iv) the stock price index declines after a restrictive SNB Bill auction; (v) SNB Bill shocks
only occur on deterministic auction days. For the local projection approach, we additionally impose
that the decline of the stock price index is permanent.
(i) and (ii) are standard in identification schemes through heteroscedasticity and structural VAR
analysis, respectively. We need (iii) to identify the impulse responses for variables other than the
stock price index (see equation 3). To provide a measure of how likely this assumption holds, we
report a one-sided test for Ω˜11 = 0, against the alternative that Ω˜11 > 0.45 (iv) is a relatively innocuous
normalization defining a “restrictive” SNB Bill auction. (v) allows to construct a counterfactual
variance-covariance matrix to control for random shocks that affect financial markets every day.
Figure 5 — Timing of auctions
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The last assumption implies that the SNB auction schedule was pre-determined and no events
occurred according to the same deterministic schedule. Indeed, the auctions were announced in
advance.46 In addition, one auction took place almost every week.47 Finally, most of the auctions
took place according to a regular and predictable schedule. In the first part of the sample period,
most auctions occurred on Tuesday (see panel a, Figure 5). In the second part of the sample, the
auction day was changed to Thursday. One motivation to change the auction day may have been to
highlight the difference between treasury bill auctions and SNB Bill auctions, which were both held
on Tuesday in the first half of the sample (see panel b).48 Indeed, the auction day changed in July
45See Appendix D for a Monte Carlo simulation.
46We have limited information from a web archive that the announcement sheet was published three working days prior
to the auction. The date, term, a minimum and maximum price, as well as the auction type were public knowledge before
the auction. Appendix A gives the link to the current auction announcement sheet.
47Only in the last week of the years 2009 and 2010 no auction took place. In the beginning of the program, the SNB
sometimes held two auctions per week.
48Rule (2011) discusses general guidelines for issuing central bank debt securities suggesting that “[. . .] clear and precise
announcements mean that market participants have a clear knowledge as to the size and regularity of central bank
operations which they can separate from the governments issuance.”
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2010, when the SNB started to regularly issue SNB Bills with a similar maturity as treasury bills.49
In addition, we require that no other deterministic events occurred on SNB Bill auction days or on the
days we use to estimate the counterfactual variance-covariance matrix. Panel (b) shows that the SNB
also held auctions for repurchase agreements (in CHF and USD), USD SNB Bills, government bonds,
and treasury bills.50 USD SNB Bill auctions occurred usually on Monday. Government bond auctions
took place on Wednesday, usually in the second week of the month. USD repo auctions took place
predominantly on Wednesday but only on the height of the financial crisis.51 Treasury bills were
auctioned each Tuesday. Almost no auctions occurred on Friday. The figure does not report the
SNB’s CHF repo operations. To the best of our knowledge these operations took place each business
day between 9:00 and 9:10 and therefore do not affect our identification scheme.
To identify the dynamic causal effect with local projections, we have to restrict the sign for one
variable at every horizon. Because we estimate the response of financial market variables, we prefer
to restrict the sign of the cumulative response. The reason is that financial market variables tend to
follow a random walk. If true, the response of the first differences is zero for h > 0. The cumulative
response, however, is non-zero even in the long run. Appendix D shows that the local projection
approach readily extends to estimating and restricting the sign of the cumulative response.52
4.3 Implementation
Our main specification uses log-changes of a Swiss nominal effective exchange rate index, a Swiss
stock price index (Swiss Market Index, SMI), as well as the change of a one-week money market rate.
We express the exchange rate as one unit of a basket of foreign currencies in terms of Swiss francs.
Therefore, a decline in the exchange rate is an effective appreciation of the Swiss franc. The SMI
comprises 20 companies with the largest market capitalization on the SIX Exchange.53 The one-week
money market rate is a zero coupon yield inferred from interest rate swaps based on SARON, an
overnight rate calculated from actual repo transactions and binding quotes.54 We then augment the
model gradually with other variables.55
To deal with missing values we remove all weekends. Therefore, our results are measured in
49Treasury bills have a maturity of three months and more. All SNB Bill auctions with a maturity of three months and
more indeed occurred on Thursday or Friday.
50Treasury bill and government bond auctions are conducted on behalf of the Swiss Confederation.
51Although the facility remained in place, the outstanding volume fell to zero in early 2009. We therefore ignore all
auction days with a zero volume.
52In addition, we discuss how to incorporate exogenous variables and provide some simulation results to illustrate
identification issues when restricting the sign of the response.
53See www.six-group.com/exchanges/knowhow/products/shares/indices_de.html.
54See www.six-group.com/exchanges/indices/data_centre/swiss_reference_rates/reference_
rates_en.html. Although there are Swiss Average Rates available for maturities of one week and more, the quotes are
often missing for periods in which the number of transactions and/or the volume of the transactions were too low. We
therefore prefer to use interest rate derivatives in the empirical analysis.
55See Appendix A for all data sources.
18
weekdays. In addition, there are missing values in stock price data when markets are closed on
holidays. We replace these missing values with the last available observation.
To control for other deterministic events that coincide with SNB Bill auctions we estimate the
variance-covariance matrix for auction days, excluding observations on which one of the following
events occurred: treasury bill auctions, government bond auctions, CHF SNB Bill payment days,
USD SNB Bill auctions, and USD repo auctions. In addition, we exclude these events when
computing the counterfactual variance-covariance matrix.
The estimation sample ranges from 20 October 2008 to 28 July 2011. We include one lag of the
endogenous variables and a constant in all models. All models are estimated by OLS. For inference,
we use 5,000 samples from a moving block bootstrap as described in ch. 8 by Efron and Tibshirani
(1993). We set the block size to 15 business days assuming that changes in financial market variables
are not very persistent.
5 Empirical results
What is the impact of a surprisingly restrictive SNB Bill auction? Figure 6 shows the impulse
responses for the exchange rate (in percent), the one-week money market rate (in percentage points),
and the response of the stock market index SMI (in percent). The negative sign of the SMI response
reflects our identifying assumption.
According to the VAR approach, a restrictive SNB Bill shock causes a 0.4% appreciation of the Swiss
franc and a 1% reduction in the SMI. In line with the theoretical model, the money market rate
increases by 0.02 percentage points. All three responses are highly persistent. The local projection
approach paints a more nuanced picture. Panel (b) confirms that the impact on the exchange rate is
relatively persistent. In addition, we observe a decline in stock prices by about 1%. The response of
the money market rate is particularly large after one business day and approaches zero thereafter.
The temporary impact on the money market rate is consistent with the fact that most SNB Bills had
a relatively short term to maturity of 7 to 28 days.
When computing the point estimates and confidence intervals, we only use those bootstrap samples
for which we can compute the impulse response. If the difference between the variance-covariance
matrix on auction days and the counterfactual variance-covariance matrix is negative, we have to
disregard the bootstrap sample. A negative difference occurs more often if, in population, the
identifying assumption does not hold. This suggests that we can test whether the identifying
assumption holds by calculating the share of bootstrap samples we use for inference. Up to five
business days, the impulse responses are based on 93% of all bootstrap samples. After 10 business
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Figure 6 — Impulse responses to a restrictive SNB Bill auction
(a) VAR
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(b) Local projections
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Notes: Estimated response for up to 10 business days to a 1 std. restrictive SNB Bill shock in black. The response of stock
market prices and the exchange rate are measured in percent, the response of interest rates in percentage points. The
shaded areas give 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence intervals based on a block bootstrap algorithm.
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days, the results are less reliable; the impulse responses are only based on 83% of all bootstrap
samples.56
Figure 7 — Impulse responses of short- and long-term interest rates
(a) VAR
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(b) Local projection
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Notes: Estimated response for up to 10 business days to a 1 std. restrictive SNB Bill shock in black. The response of interest
rates are measured in percentage points. The shaded areas give 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence intervals based on a block
bootstrap algorithm.
Next, we ask how a restrictive SNB Bill shock affects interest rates of various maturities. We add
changes of zero coupon yields based on interest rate swaps for maturities of three months, one year,
and 10 years (see Figure 7).57 Panel (a) shows that three-month and one-year rates increase slightly
but the responses are much less precisely estimated and indistinguishable from zero. By contrast,
the ten-year rate declines. Although the local projection impulse responses are even more noisy they
confirm the results from the VAR approach qualitatively. In particular, ten-year rates decline after
a restrictive SNB Bill auction. One explanation for the decline of long-term interest rates is that an
SNB Bill auction appreciates the Swiss franc. Because of the restrictive impact on the exchange rate,
markets lower their short-term interest rate expectations. Therefore, long-term interest rates decline.
Long-term interest rates could decline because of lower expected real rates or lower inflation
expectations. Figure 8 provides evidence that inflation expectations were not affected. We show the
56In what follows we discuss this statistic only for cases where results may not be as reliable.
57We also experimented with zero coupon government bond yields. The results are qualitatively identical.
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Figure 8 — Impulse responses of corporate bonds denominated in Swiss francs
(a) VAR
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(b) Local projection
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Notes: Estimated response for up to 10 business days to a 1 std. restrictive SNB Bill shock in black. The response of interest
rates are measured in percentage points. The shaded areas give 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence intervals based on a block
bootstrap algorithm.
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results from a model including corporate bonds of domestic companies and foreign companies that
issue corporate bonds in Swiss francs.58 Because both, domestic and foreign bonds, are denominated
in Swiss francs they should be equally affected by changes in inflation expectations. Therefore, the
difference between the responses reflects changes in domestic real interest rates relative to abroad. We
find a decline in yields for domestic corporate bonds but not for foreign corporate bonds. Therefore,
future expected real interest rates declined in Switzerland relative to real interest rates abroad.59 The
local projection estimates are imprecise and confirm the result only on impact.
Does the term of an SNB Bill matter? On the one hand, short-term Bills may have little effect because
they soak up reserves only for a brief period. On the other hand, the impact may be large if financial
market participants expect that the SNB systematically rolls over newly created Bills when they
mature. Figure 9 shows the responses to SNB Bill auctions with a short term to maturity of 6 months
or less. We find similar impulse responses as in the main specification when we limit the sample to
short-term SNB Bill auctions. Unfortunately, estimates for longer maturities are not reliable because
we find an overwhelming share of responses that do not fulfill our identifying assumption. We
therefore do not report these results.
5.1 Policy experiments
We use our estimates to perform policy experiments. In particular, we ask how an increase of the
interest rate floor from 0% to 0.25% affects stock prices and the exchange rate. We assume that the
central bank implements a debt security program that persistently raises the one-week money market
rate to 0.25%.
First, we simulate such a policy by scaling the variance of the structural shock to obtain the desired
response of the money market rate. Second, we perform the policy experiment using an alternative
identification scheme imposing a normalization on the initial response of the money market rate.60
We choose the scale of the shock and the initial response, respectively, to generate a money market
rate response of 0.25% after five weekdays.
According to the first identification scheme such a policy has relevant effects on stock prices and
the exchange rate (see Figure 10, panel a). At the upper end of the 90% confidence interval, the stock
price index falls by 7% and the exchange rate appreciates by 3%. The point estimates point to a rather
strong decline in stock prices by 20% and a 6% appreciation.
According to the second identification scheme, the results are qualitatively similar (see panel b).
However, the responses are smaller in absolute value. The stock price index falls by 5% and the
58All yields have a term to maturity of 8 years. Foreign bonds are issued by corporations with an excellent credit rating.
59Unfortunately, we cannot assess whether relative real interest rates decline because of a decline in risk premia.
60Appendix D shows that this is a scaled version of the estimator used by Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a).
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Figure 9 — Impulse responses to a restrictive short-term SNB Bill auction
(a) VAR
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(b) Local projection
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Notes: Estimated response for up to 10 business days to a 1 std. restrictive SNB Bill shock in black. The response of stock
market prices and the exchange rate are measured in percent, the response of interest rates in percentage points. The
shaded areas give 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence intervals based on a block bootstrap algorithm.
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Figure 10 — Effect of a 0.25% interest rate floor
(a) Main specification with scaled shock
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(b) Alternative identification of interest rate shock
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Notes: Estimated response for up to 10 business days to a restrictive SNB Bill shock leading to a 0.25% increase in the
money market rate (panel a). The alternative identification scheme imposes an initial response of the money market rate
leading to a 0.25% money market rate after five weekdays (panel b). The response of stock market prices and the exchange
rate are measured in percent, the response of interest rates in percentage points. The shaded areas give 99%, 95%, and 90%
confidence intervals based on a block bootstrap algorithm.
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exchange rate appreciates by 3%. Note that the alternative identification scheme captures the impact
of an SNB Bill auction only to the extent that it affects the one-week money market rate. The smaller
response may therefore reflect that SNB Bill auctions not only worked through the short-term money
market rate but also through expectations about future policy actions. The first identification scheme
may better capture these changes in expectations.
5.2 Placebo tests
As placebo tests we estimate the impulse responses using dummy variables, for which we expect
the impact on financial market variables to be zero. Our placebo tests confirm that actual SNB Bill
auction days systematically differ from other days without an auction.
First, we estimate the model on a sample from January 2005 to January 2008. During this period, no
SNB Bill auctions took place. Instead, we generate a placebo dummy variable with 170 random
auctions occurring on either Tuesday or Thursday. We then estimate the immediate impulse
responses on 200 different placebo samples. Based on these placebo estimates, we can compute
various statistics. The average impact indicates whether we find the same sign and magnitude of the
effect as in the actual sample. Then, we compute the share of placebo samples in which we reject the
null hypothesis of no response at the 10% level. We test the null against the one-sided alternative
of a drop in the SMI, an appreciation of the exchange rate, and an increase in the interest rate. The
share of rejections indicates how often we would falsely draw the same conclusion as in the main
specification. Finally, we compute share of placebo samples where at least 90% of the bootstrapped
impulse responses are consistent with our identifying assumption. This share indicates how likely
we would wrongly conclude that our identifying assumption is satisfied.
Panel (a) of Table 1 shows the results. The summary statistics suggest that there was no impact of
the placebo auctions on financial market variables before the SNB Bills program was in place. The
average coefficient on the exchange rate and the money market rate are small and of the opposite
sign compared to our actual estimates. In addition, rejection rates for the money market rate and the
exchange rate are small. The negative coefficient on the SMI and the high rejection rate reflect our
identifying assumption. Additionally, we can investigate how many of the bootstrap samples are
consistent with the imposed identifying assumption. The last row shows that this is almost never the
case.
Second, we perform a placebo test using the original sample during which the SNB Bills program
was in place. We randomly select placebo days on which no SNB Bill auction occurred. Panel (b)
shows that there is no evidence that the Swiss franc appreciates or the interest rate increases during
these random auction days, although we condition on a decline in stock prices. In fact, the average
coefficient carries the opposite sign relative to our main specification. Moreover, the identifying
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Table 1 — Placebo tests
(a) Random auction day before SNB Bill program
SMI Exchange rate Interest rate
Average impact -0.28 0.10 -0.02
Share rejected 1.00 0.02 0.05
Share identified 0.01 0.01 0.01
(b) Random auction day during SNB Bill program (excluding actual auctions)
SMI Exchange rate Interest rate
Average impact -0.47 0.53 -0.02
Share rejected 1.00 0.00 0.00
Share identified 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Results of two placebo simulations using 170 auction dummies generated on random days. Panel (a) uses a sample
from 2005 to 2008, when no SNB Bills were issued, with random auctions occurring on Tuesdays or Wednesdays. Panel (b)
uses the actual sample, when SNB Bills were issued, with random auctions occurring on days without an SNB Bill auction.
We generate 200 placebo samples. The first row reports the average of the immediate impact (averaged over all bootstrap
replications and placebo samples). The second row reports the share of placebo samples rejecting the null hypothesis of
no response at the 10% level. We test the null against the one-sided alternative of a drop in the SMI, an appreciation of the
exchange rate, and an increase in the interest rate. The last row shows the share of placebo samples where at least 90% of
the bootstrapped impulse responses exist.
assumption almost never holds.
Third, we examine whether other events had an impact on financial market variables (the payment
day, auctions of SNB Bills in USD, and treasury bill auctions). The payment day should not matter
if all information about the auction was already revealed on the auction day. SNB Bill auctions in
USD should not affect the Swiss money market rate because they do not drain CHF reserves. Finally,
we expect that treasury bill auctions have no impact because the SNB issues these bills on behalf of
the Swiss Confederation, that is, without the intention of draining reserves. The results are shown
in Appendix E for brevity. The responses of the exchange rate and the interest rates are close to zero
even though we condition on a drop in stock market prices. Only for treasury bill auctions we find
an appreciation. However, the share of bootstrap replications where the identifying assumption is
fulfilled amounts only to 37% suggesting that these results are less reliable.
5.3 Robustness tests
We perform a range of robustness tests (Appendix E shows the results). Adding exogenous variables,
increasing the number of lags, or increasing the block size in the bootstrap algorithm to 40, does not
change the results.61 We also use different stock market indexes to identify the impulse responses
(i.e. the MSCI Switzerland and the SPI, both including a broader range of Swiss companies). In both
cases, the results remain the same. Then, we estimate the model with an overnight money market
61Specifically we added the EUR/USD exchange rate, a European stock market index, and a European stock market
volatility index.
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rate. While we still find an appreciation of the currency, there is no effect on the overnight rate.
Finally, we estimate a model including bilateral exchange rates (CHF/EUR, CHF/USD, CHF/JPY).
SNB Bills cause an appreciation against the EUR, an imprecisely estimated appreciation against the
USD, and no appreciation against the JPY. Finally, we control only for those treasury bill auction
days on which no SNB Bill auction took place. This increases the number of auction days in the first
half of the sample when both auctions usually occurred on Tuesday. The results remain qualitatively
similar, although the response of the money market rate is less precisely estimated and the absolute
impact is generally smaller. This is in line with the idea that treasury bill auctions had no or a smaller
impact on financial market variables than SNB Bill auctions.
6 Concluding remarks
Central banks created large amounts of reserves in the wake of the financial and sovereign debt crises.
To raise the money market rate in such an environment, central banks can sell assets, pay interest on
reserves, or issue interest-bearing debt securities (see e.g. Berentsen et al. 2018). Our paper exploits
the Swiss National Bank’s debt security program to estimate the causal effects of such exit strategies
on financial market variables.
We use a theoretical model of the money market to show how central banks affect the interest rate
floor with debt securities. The money market rate increases in the volume of, and yield on, debt
securities through a cost channel. Similar to interest on reserves, central bank debt is therefore able to
implement an interest rate floor. In addition, central bank debt affects the money market rate through
a reserve-absorbing channel. The reserve-absorbing channel is particularly relevant if reserves are
scarce and negligible if reserves are ample. These theoretical considerations suggest that we can
estimate the impact of variation in the interest rate floor by unexpected changes in the SNB’s debt
security program.
Our empirical analysis shows that SNB Bill auctions indeed affect financial market variables. A
restrictive SNB Bill auction raises the money market rate, appreciates the Swiss franc, reduces
long-term interest rates, and pushes down stock prices. Our estimates suggest relevant effects on
stock prices and the exchange rate even for a small change in the interest rate floor from 0% to
0.25%. Raising the money market rate through an interest rate floor therefore affects asset prices
and exchange rates even if reserves are ample.
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Online Appendix
A Data
Table A.1 — Data and sources
Name Time stamp Source Links
CHF SNB Bills SNB www.snb.ch/en/mmr/reference/snb_bills_
res/source/snb_bills_res.en.pdf and
www.snb.ch/en/mmr/reference/snb_bills_
new/source/snb_bills_new.en.pdf
USD SNB Bills SNB www.snb.ch/de/mmr/reference/snb_usd_
repo_results_20181121/source/snb_usd_
repo_results_20181121.de.pdf
CHF repo auctions SNB www.snb.ch/en/mmr/reference/repo_mb23/
source/repo_mb23.en.pdf
USD repo auctions SNB www.snb.ch/en/mmr/reference/snb_usd_
repo_results_20190123/source/snb_usd_
repo_results_20190123.en.pdf
Government bond auctions Federal
Finance
Administration
www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/
dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.
msg-id-16132.html
Treasury bill auctions Federal
Finance
Administration
www.newsd.admin.ch/newsd/message/
attachments/54842.pdf
Weekly reserves SNB www.snb.ch/de/iabout/stat/statrep/id/
statpub_impdata
Monthly liabilities SNB data.snb.ch/en/topics/snb#!/cube/
snbbipo
Stock market data (SMI, SPI,
MSCI, VSTOXX, EURO STOXX
50)
Trade close Datastream
Effective exchange rate 11:00 am SNB data.snb.ch/en/topics/ziredev#!/cube/
devwkieffid and www.snb.ch/n/mmr/
reference/economic_studies_2017_11/
source/economic_studies_2017_11.n.pdf
Bilateral exchange rates 2:15 am ECB www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_
exchange_rates/euro_reference_exchange_
rates/html/index.en.html
Swiss Average Rates (SAR) 4:00 pm SNB data.snb.ch/de/topics/ziredev#!/cube/
zirepo
Zero coupon yields based on IRS
on SARON
4:00 pm Reuters/Datastream
Government bond yields Morning SNB data.snb.ch/en/topics/ziredev#!/cube/
rendoblid
Corporate bond yields Morning SNB data.snb.ch/en/topics/ziredev#!/cube/
rendoblid
Libor interest rates 12:00 am Federal
Reserve
Bank of St.
Louis
fred.stlouisfed.org/categories/33003
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B Proofs
B.1 Proof of proposition 1
Optimization with respect to pii ∈ [0, picb] of
L = iaAi + ibpii(Ri +Bi)− imBi − idE(D − Z)− ix
∫ ∞
zˆi
Xif(Z)dZ − λ1,i(pii − picb) + λ2,ipii
yields the following first order condition
Fi
(
ib − ix
∫ ∞
zˆi
f(Z)dZ
)
− λ1,i + λ2,i = 0
Fi
(
ib − ix(1− F (Z < (1− pii)Fi −K))
)
− λ1,i + λ2,i = 0
Fi
(
ib − ixP (Xi > 0)
)
− λ1,i + λ2,i = 0
together with the complementary slackness conditions
λ1,i(pii − picb) = 0
λ2,ipii = 0 .
Therefore, λ1,i > 0 if pii = picb and λ2,i > 0 if pii = 0. Thus, a commercial bank optimally holds pii = picb
if ib − ixP (Xi > 0) > 0, pii = 0 if ib − ixP (Xi > 0) < 0, and pii ∈ (0, picb) if ib − ixP (Xi > 0) = 0.62
If expected profits do not change in pii (i.e. if ib − ixP (Xi > 0) = 0), commercial bank i is indifferent
between holding an additional unit of debt securities and an additional unit of reserves. Therefore,
ib − ixP (Xi > 0) = 0 defines the indifference fraction p¯ii.
ib = ixP (Xi(p¯ii) > 0)
ib
ix
= P (Z > (1− p¯ii)Fi −K)
p¯ii = 1−
P−1
(
1− ibix
)
+K
Fi
62 Expected commercial bank profits strictly increase in pii if ib− ixP (Xi > 0) > 0. A commercial bank is willing to hold
any picb up to the point at which a marginal increase in pii does no longer increase expected profits. Formally,
dE(Πi)
dpii
= ibFi − ix
[∫ ∞
zˆi
∂Xi
∂pii
f(Z)dZ +Xi(zˆi)f(zˆi)
∂(zˆi)
∂pii
]
dE(Πi)
dpii
= Fi
(
ib − ixP (Xi > 0)
)
.
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where P−1(·) is the inverse cumulative distribution function of Xi. Because we assume that the
central bank is the only institution that offers central bank debt securities, we impose min(p¯ii) = 0.
p¯ii = min
0, 1− P−1
(
1− ibix
)
+K
Fi

In sum, pii = min(picb, p¯ii). Optimization with respect to Bi ≥ −Ri of
L = iaAi + ibpii(Ri +Bi)− imBi − idE(D − Z)− ix
∫ ∞
zˆi
Xif(Z)dZ + µi(Bi +Ri)
yields the following first order condition
ib min(pi
cb, p¯ii) + ib
∂min(picb, p¯ii)
∂Bi
− im − ix
[∫ ∞
zˆi
∂Xi
∂Bi
f(Z)dZ +Xi(zˆi)f(zˆi)
∂(zˆi)
∂Bi
]
+ µi = 0
im = ib
(
min(picb, p¯ii) +
∂min(picb, p¯ii)
∂Bi
)
− ix
∫ ∞
zˆi
∂Xi
∂Bi
f(Z)dZ + µi ,
where Xi = Z − (1− pii)(Bi +Ri) +K, Xi(zˆi) = 0, and
∂Xi
∂Bi
= −(1−min(picb, p¯ii)) + ∂min(pi
cb, p¯ii)
∂Bi
.
Using that zˆi = (1−min(picb, p¯ii))(Bi +Ri)−K it follows that
im = ib
(
min(picb, p¯ii) +
∂min(picb, p¯ii)
∂Bi
)
+
(
(1−min(picb, p¯ii))− ∂min(pi
cb, p¯ii)
∂Bi
)
ixP (Xi > 0) + µi .
More transparently
im =

ibpii + (1− pii)ixP (Xi > 0) + µi, if picb < p¯ii
ibpii + (1− pii)ixP (Xi > 0) + ∂p¯ii∂Bi (ib − ixP (Xi > 0)) + µi, if picb ≥ p¯ii
Use that if picb > p¯ii, we have pii = p¯ii which, by construction, implies ib − ixP (Xi > 0) = 0.
Furthermore, the complementary slackness condition requires
µi(Bi +Ri) = 0 .
Hence, if Bi > −Ri (which is true in equilibrium)
im = ibpii + (1− pii)ixP (Xi > 0) .
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Guess the solution to be Bi +Ri = ζ1 ∀i and pii = pi ∀i. Then
im = ibpi + (1− pi)ixP (X(ζ1) > 0) .
To check if the guess is compatible with the market clearing condition, combine the (integrated) guess∫ 1
0 (Bi +Ri)di = ζ1 with the market clearing condition
∫ 1
0 Bidi = 0 to obtain∫ 1
0
Ridi = ζ1 . (4)
Furthermore, by definition,
∫ 1
0 (Bi + Ri)di =
∫ 1
0 Fidi. In combination with the market clearing
condition
∫ 1
0 Bidi = 0, it follows that ∫ 1
0
Ridi = F . (5)
Combining equations 4 and 5 yields ζ1 = F . Thus, in equilibrium, the money market rate is equal to
im = ibpii + (1− pi)ixP (X > 0) ,
where X = Z − (1− pi)F +K.
B.2 Proof of proposition 2
Optimization with respect to Bi ≥ −Ri of
L = iaAi + iior(Bi +Ri)− iiorm Bi − idE(D − Z)− ix
∫ ∞
zˆiori
Xiori f(Z)dZ + µi(Bi +Ri)
yields the following first order condition
iior − iiorm − ix
[∫ ∞
zˆiori
∂Xiori
∂Bi
f(Z)dZ +Xiori (zˆ
ior
i )f(zˆ
ior
i )
∂(zˆiori )
∂Bi
]
+ µi = 0
iiorm = iior − ix
∫ ∞
zˆiori
∂Xiori
∂Bi
f(Z)dZ + µi ,
where Xiori = Z − (Bi +Ri) +K, and
∂Xiori
∂Bi
= −1 .
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Using that zˆiori = (Bi +Ri)−K it follows that
iiorm = iior + ix
∫ ∞
zˆiori
f(Z)dZ + µi
iiorm = iior + ixP (X
ior
i > 0) + µi .
Furthermore, the complementary slackness condition requires
µi(Bi +Ri) = 0 .
Hence, if Bi > −Ri (which is true in equilibrium)
iiorm = iior + ixP (X
ior
i > 0) .
Guess the solution to be Bi +Ri = ζ2 ∀i and pii = pi ∀i. Then
iiorm = iior + ixP (X
ior(ζ2) > 0) .
To check if the guess is compatible with the market clearing condition, combine the (integrated) guess∫ 1
0 (Bi +Ri)di = ζ2 with the market clearing condition
∫ 1
0 Bidi = 0 to obtain∫ 1
0
Ridi = ζ2 . (6)
Furthermore, by definition,
∫ 1
0 (Bi + Ri)di =
∫ 1
0 Fidi. In combination with the market clearing
condition
∫ 1
0 Bidi = 0, it follows that ∫ 1
0
Ridi = F . (7)
Combining equation 6 and 7 yields ζ2 = F . Thus, in equilibrium, the money market rate is equal to
iiorm = iior + ixP (X
ior > 0) ,
where Xior = Z − F +K.
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C Further insights from the money market model
C.1 The maximum fraction of F invested in debt securities
By construction, p¯ii is the fraction of pre-auction reserves that makes a commercial bank indifferent
between holding an additional unit of debt securities and an additional unit of reserves.
Proposition 3 The maximum fraction of Fi invested in debt securities is p¯ii = max
(
0, 1− P
−1
(
1− ib
ix
)
+K
Fi
)
.
Proof. Solve dE(Πi)dpii = 0 ⇔ ib − ixP (Xi > 0) = 0 for p¯ii and assume that the central bank is the only
institution that offers central bank debt securities (i.e. impose min(p¯ii) = 0).
Figure C.1 — The maximum fraction of Fi invested in debt securities (p¯ii)
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Figure C.1 presents p¯i = p¯ii ∀i conditional on ib and F . A tighter money market (a lower F ) leads to
lower desired debt security holdings (lower p¯i) for two reasons. First, the probability of a liquidity
shortage rises in debt security investments. Second, liquidity shortages are costly if the discount rate
is higher than the yield on debt securities ( ibix < 1). At the margin it does not pay off for commercial
banks to hold an extra unit of debt securities if this triggers, in expectation, a liquidity shortage
costing ix > ib.
If pre-auction reserves F become sufficiently scarce, commercial banks abstain from investing in debt
securities (limFi→0 p¯ii = 0). In contrast, if pre-auction reserves go to infinity, commercial banks are
willing to hold any fraction of reserves in debt securities (limFi→∞ p¯ii = 1).
C.2 The probability of a liquidity shortage
Proposition 4 The probability of a liquidity shortage weakly decreases in pre-auction reserves. Formally,
∂P (Xi>0)
∂Fi
= Ipii<p¯ii
(
−φ
(
(1− pii)Fi −K
)[
1− pii
])
< 0, where φ((1 − pii)Fi − K) > 0 is the probability
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density function of Z evaluated at (1− pii)Fi −K and Ipii<p¯ii is an indicator function taking on the value 1 if
pii < p¯ii and zero otherwise.
Proof. Take the partial derivative of P (Xi > 0) = 1 − Fi(Z < zˆi) with respect to Fi and use zˆi =
(1− pii)Fi −K.
Figure C.2 — The probability of a liquidity shortage
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The left panel in Figure C.2 displays the probability of a liquidity shortage, P (Xi > 0), as a function
of pre-auction reserves, Fi, conditional on ib = 0.10%. P (Xi > 0) is constant in Fi if the commercial
bank holds its desired amount of post-auction reserves Li (because p¯ii adjusts to changes in Fi to
ensure (1 − p¯ii)Fi = Li). In contrast, if (1 − pii)Fi > Li, a decrease in Fi increases the probability of a
liquidity shortage.
The right panel in Figure C.2 plots P (Xi > 0) as a function of pre-auction reserves conditional on
pi = 0.50. The probability of a liquidity shortage increases in the yield of the debt securities because
in relative terms, liquidity shortages become less costly in ib.
D Identification of dynamic causal effects through heteroscedasticity
This section derives a dynamic event study estimator. The estimator is closely related to
the heteroscedasticity-based identification schemes by Rigobon (2003), Rigobon and Sack (2004),
Lu¨tkepohl (2012), Lu¨tkepohl et al. (2018), and Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a).
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D.1 Identification through heteroscedasticity
Suppose that the data are generated by an N -variable structural VAR(1):63
Byt = Γyt−1 + et, E[ete′t] = D ,
where et denotes an N -dimensional vector of i.i.d. structural shocks. The reduced-form
representation of the VAR reads:
yt = Φyt−1 + Ψet .
where Φ = B−1Γ is a matrix of autoregressive coefficients and Ψ ≡ B−1 measures the immediate
impact of the i.i.d. structural shocks et on yt. The identification problem manifests itself in the fact that
we cannot estimate Ψ from the reduced-form representation of the VAR. However, we can estimate
Φ and the one-step-ahead forecast errors (residuals):
εt|t−1 = Ψet .
Heteroscedasiticity-based identification schemes assume that the variance of some of the shocks
increases only in some periods, while other parameters of the model remain unchanged. In our
setting we assume:
Assumption 1 Structural shock 1 (e1t) affects yt only in particular periods (“events”). The timing is
deterministic and known to the econometrician.
Assumption 2 All other parameters are constant.
Under these assumptions, the residuals are a linear combination of structural shocks, where shock
e1t appears only if an event occurs
εt|t−1 =

I(t∈E)ψ11e1t + ψ12e2t + · · ·+ ψ1NeNt
I(t∈E)ψ21e1t + ψ22e2t + · · ·+ ψ2NeNt
. . .
I(t∈E)ψN1e1t + ψN2e2t + · · ·+ ψNNeNt
 ,
where we define I(t∈E) as an indicator function that equals one if the event occurs in period t and
zero otherwise. Thus, the variance of the residuals differs for periods with an event and without an
63We ignore deterministic terms for simplicity.
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event. Let the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals if no event occurs be:
Ωt/∈E =

ω11 ω12 . . . ω1N
. . .
...
ωNN
 .
Then, the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals if an event occurs then amounts to:
Ωt∈E =

ψ211σ
2
1 + ω11 ψ11ψ21σ
2
1 + ω12 . . . ψ11ψN1σ
2
1 + ω1N
. . .
...
ψ2N1σ
2
1 + ωNN
 .
It follows that the difference between the two covariance matrices depends only on the impulse
responses to shock 1, and the variance of the structural shock.
Ω˜ = Ωt∈E − Ωt/∈E =

ψ211σ
2
1 ψ11ψ21σ
2
1 . . . ψ11ψN1σ
2
1
. . .
...
ψ2N1σ
2
1

At this stage, it is useful to discuss whether we can identify the parameters. First, we cannot identify
the sign of the responses without further assumptions. If we multiply all ψij by −1 we obtain the
same expression for Ω˜. Second, we cannot identify the scale of the impulse responses. If we multiply
all impulse responses by a factor γ and divide the standard deviation of the structural shocks by γ we
obtain the same expression for Ω˜. Therefore, we need to impose additional identifying assumptions.
Assumption 3 The variance of the structural shocks is unity.
This is a standard assumption in structural VAR analysis and reflects that we cannot distinguish the
response to the structural shock from the standard deviation of the structural shock.
Assumption 4 The sign of one particular response is known.
Without loss of generality, let us assume that we know that the response of variable 1 is positive. We
can estimate the responses from the first row of Ω˜ as follows:64
ψ11 =
√
Ω˜11
ψN1 = Ω˜N1/ψ11 ,
where Ω˜ij denotes the row i, column j element of Ω˜. From these expressions we see that we can
64If it is negative, we would multiply the response by −1.
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compute the responses of all other variables only if Ω˜11 > 0. Otherwise, the responses do not exist.
Therefore, we formally need another identifying assumption:
Assumption 5 Structural shock 1 (e1t) affects yt (Ω˜11 > 0).
Three remarks are in order. First, with our additional identifying assumptions, the model is
overidentified and we could set up a more efficient GMM estimator and test the overidentifying
restrictions (see Rigobon and Sack 2004). Second, we see that we may run into a “weak instrument”
problem. If ψ11 is close to zero we overestimate ψN1. This is related to the identifying assumption
that there is an impact of structural shock 1 on variable 1 when the event occurs. If Ω˜11 is zero
ψN1 we cannot compute ψN1 because the identifying assumption is violated. Third, this resembles
the estimator used by Rigobon (2003) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a). The main difference
is that we do not associate the response with a particular policy variable for which the response is
normalized to unity. Instead, we impose a sign restriction on one of the variables which allows us
to estimate the impulse response to a one standard deviation structural shock for all variables in the
system.
The estimator by Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a) is particularly useful when we want to restrict
the response of one variable to a specific value. For example, we may be interested in the impact of
an increase in the money market rate by 0.25 percentage points. Let us choose the variance of the
structural shock so that the response of variable 1 corresponds to the desired value, say c. Then,
ψ11 =
√
Ω˜11
σ21
= c .
This expression determines the variance of the structural shock needed to obtain the desired
response. In addition, note that
ψ21 =
Ω˜12
ψ11σ21
.
Replacing the response of variable 1 by c and the variance of the structural shock by σ21 = Ω˜11/c
2
yields
ψ21 =
Ω˜12
Ω˜11
c ,
which is exactly the estimator by Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a) when setting c = 1.
D.2 Impulse responses using a VAR
It is straightforward to recursively compute the impulse responses using the VAR parameters. Let
Ψ0 = [ψ11 ψ21 . . . ψN1]
′ be the impact of structural shock 1 on all variables in the system. For a
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VAR(1) we can compute the dynamic impact after h periods as:
Ψh = Φ
hΨ0 .
To estimate the dynamic impact for a VAR(p), we can use the recursion:
Ψ1 = Φ1Ψ0
Ψ2 = Φ1Ψ1 + Φ2Ψ0
...
Ψh = Φ1Ψh−1 + Φ2Ψh−2 + . . .ΦpΨh−p for h ≥ p .
D.3 Impulse responses using local projections
Estimating impulse responses using a VAR is more efficient relative to local projections (Stock and
Watson 2018). Local projections are more robust, however, if the model is misspecified (Jorda` 2005).
We therefore propose to alternatively estimate the impulse responses using local projections. Besides
larger standard errors, the local projection approach comes at the cost that we have to restrict the sign
of one response at all horizons.
To keep the discussion as simple as possible, we still assume that the data are generated by a VAR(1)
but we want to estimate the impulse response using local projections. Let Ψh denote the impulse
response after h periods. We can iterate the VAR backwards one period to obtain:
yt = Φ(Φyt−2 + Ψ0et−1) + Ψ0et
yt = Φ
2yt−2 + Ψ1et−1 + Ψ0et ,
where Ψ1 ≡ ΦΨ0 denotes the impulse response after one period. We exploit that the change in
the direct forecast (local projection) of an econometrician when one additional observation becomes
available differs between periods with an without an event.
E[yt|yt−1]− E[yt|yt−2] = E[yt|yt−1]− yt − E[yt|yt−2] + yt
= εt|t−2 − εt|t−1 .
We exploit that the difference between the two-step-ahead and one-step-ahead forecast errors equals
the period t impact of the structural shocks from period t− 1:
εt|t−2 − εt|t−1 = Ψ1et−1 .
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Let Ω1 ≡ V [εt|t−2 − εt|t−1]. We can base our estimator of the dynamic response on the following
covariance matrices:
Ω˜1 = Ω1,t−1∈E − Ω1,t−1/∈E ,
and estimate the dynamic response by:
ψ1,11 =
√
Ω˜1,11
ψ1,N1 = Ω˜1,N1/ψ1,11 ,
where Ω˜1,ij is the row i column j element of Ω˜1.
More generally, to estimate the response after h periods we can iterate the VAR backwards to obtain:
yt = Φ
h+1yt−h−1 + Ψ0et + Ψ1et−1 + Ψ2et−2 + · · ·+ Ψhet−h ,
and
εt|t−h−1 − εt|t−h = Ψhet−h .
Then we can estimate the impulse response using
Ω˜h = Ωh,t−h∈E − Ωh,t−h/∈E ,
and
ψh,11 =
√
Ω˜h,11
ψh,N1 = Ω˜h,N1/ψh,11 .
We estimate the response after h periods comparing the variance of the forecast revision in period
t − h if an event occurred h periods ago with the variance if no event occurred h periods ago.
However, we require a sign restriction at every horizon. For many macroeconomic and financial
market variables, restricting the sign of the response at every horizon does not seem sensible. It may
be more reasonable to restrict the sign of the cumulative response if we expect the shock to have a
large immediate impact which fades away slowly. For example, changes in asset prices may respond
immediately but the response may be zero at longer horizons. Therefore, it may be reasonable to
restrict the cumulative response of asset price returns.
To identify the cumulative response, we can add lagged yt to the left-hand-side of the local projection
(similar as Stock and Watson 2018). We restrict the discussion to h = 1, but for longer horizons the
43
derivations are similar. First, note that the cumulative response amounts to:
Ψ0 + Ψ1 = (I + Φ)Ψ0 ,
where I is a conformable identity matrix. If we add yt−1 on both sides of the equation of the VAR
iterated one period backwards we obtain:
yt + yt−1 = Φ2yt−2 + Ψ1et−1 + Ψ0et + yt−1 .
Replacing yt−1 with the Φyt−2 + Ψ0et−1 yields
yt + yt−1 = Φ2yt−2 + Ψ1et−1 + Ψ0et + Φyt−2 + Ψ0et−1
= (Φ + Φ2)yt−2 + (Ψ0 + Ψ1)et−1 + Ψ0et .
The two-step-ahead forecast error comprises a linear combination of past (period t − 1) and current
(period t) shocks. We can remove period t shocks by subtracting the one-step-ahead forecast error.
εt|t−2 − εt|t−1 = (Ψ0 + Ψ1)et−1
and proceed as before to estimate the response.
More generally, let εt|t−h−1 be the h− 1 step-ahead forecast error in
h∑
j=0
yt−j = Φh+1yt−h−1 + εt|t−h−1 .
It follows that
εt|t−h−1 − εt|t−h =
 h∑
j=0
Ψh
 et−h .
Let Ωh = V [εt|t−h−1−εt|t−h]. We can then estimate the cumulative response using the same estimator
as before.
D.4 Exogenous variables
It is straightforward to include exogenous variables. If the data are generated by a VARX(1) we have
yt = Θ0xt + Θ1xt−1 + Φyt−1 + Ψet .
For estimating the immediate impact, we only have to include the concurrent and lagged exogenous
variables when estimating the residuals and proceed as before. Estimating the dynamic impact using
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the VAR approach then immediately follows. It turns out that we can also use the same approach
when estimating the responses with local projections by including exogenous variables up to lag h−1
when estimating εt|t−h. The reason is that the impact of overlapping exogenous variables cancels out
when calculating the difference εt|t−h−1 − εt|t−h.
D.5 Simulations
To show under which circumstances the identification scheme works and illustrate potential pitfalls,
we first simulate 250,000 observations from a VAR(2):
yt = B
−1Γ1yt−1 +B−1Γ2yt−2 +B−1et ,
with
B−1 =

0.7 0.5 0.3
0.8 −0.9 0.1
0.5 0.4 0.2
 Γ1 =

0.3 0.7 0.1
0.2 0.2 0.2
0.4 0.5 −0.4
 Γ2 =

0.1 0.2 0.05
0.2 0.3 0.1
0.2 0.3 0.1
 E[ete′t] =

2 0 0
0 3 0
0 0 2

When simulating the data we impose that shock 1 happens every 5th period while the other shocks
occur every period. To estimate the impact of shock 1 we restrict the response of the first variable to
be positive.
The black lines in Figure D.1 show the estimates of the impulse response functions.65 The red lines are
the actual impulse response functions. Not surprisingly, the VAR approach identifies the responses
(panels a and c).
Panels (b) and (d) show the estimates using local projections. In panel (b) the identifying assumption
requires that the response of variable 1 is always positive. We have an identification problem when
the red line crosses the zero line. Because of our identification scheme, the response of variable 1 has
to remain positive, leading to a wrong sign in the responses of all other variables. Panel (d) shows
that that we avoid this problem when identifying the response by restricting the cumulative response.
Because the cumulative response of variable 1 is always positive, we also identify the responses of
all other variables.
Next, we illustrate the empirical implementation of our two approaches by simulating a smaller
number of observations (2,000) and estimate confidence intervals using a moving block bootstrap
approach (see Efron and Tibshirani 1993, section 8.6). We set the block size to 80 and draw 5,000
bootstrap samples.
65We scaled the impulse response using the inverse standard deviation of structural shock 1 so that it matches the actual
impulse response. In practice, as noted before, we are not able to separately identify the scale of the impulse response and
the standard deviation of the structural shock.
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Figure D.1 — Estimates based on 250,000 observations
(a) VAR response
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(b) Local projection response
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(c) VAR cumulative response
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(d) Local projection cumulative response
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Notes: Actual response (red line with dots) and estimated response (black line).
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Figure D.2 — Estimates based on 2,000 observations
(a) VAR response
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(b) Local projection response
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(c) VAR cumulative response
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(d) Local projection cumulative response
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Notes: Actual response (red line with dots) and estimated response (black line). The shaded areas give 99%, 95%, and 90%
confidence intervals based on a block bootstrap algorithm.
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Figure D.2 shows that the VAR approach is more efficient and identifies the (cumulative) responses.
The local projection approach does not identify the non-cumulative responses. Moreover, the
local projection estimator yields imprecise cumulative responses. Therefore, we face the following
trade-off in practice. Either we choose a particular model to estimate the dynamic effects. These
estimates will be precise but biased if the VAR is misspecified. Or, we use local projections which
are more robust with respect to model misspecification. This comes at the cost, however, that these
responses are less precisely estimated and we have to impose a plausible sign restriction at every
horizon.
We also perform a Monte Carlo exercise to examine the properties of a test for one of the identifying
assumptions (Ω˜11 > 0). We simulate 500 samples with 2,000 observations from the VAR and estimate
the impulse responses in each sample with the block bootstrap algorithm. Then, we test in each
sample whether Ω˜11 = 0 against the one-sided alternative that Ω˜11 > 0 at the 10% level. Finally, we
compute the share of Monte Carlo samples where we reject the null hypothesis. We would expect to
reject the null hypothesis in 90% of all cases because we know that the identifying assumption holds
in population. Indeed, we find a rejection rate of 91%.
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E Robustness and placebo tests
Figure E.1 — Placebo tests
(a) VAR for payment day
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(b) VAR for USD Bill auctions
−1.5
−1.0
−0.5
0.0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SM
I (i
n p
erc
en
t)
−0.3
0.0
0.3
0.6
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ex
ch
an
ge
 ra
te
 (in
 pe
rce
nt)
−0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
M
on
ey
 m
ar
ke
t r
a
te
 (in
 pp
)
(c) VAR for treasury bill auctions
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Notes: Estimated response for up to 10 business days to a 1 std. restrictive SNB Bill shock in black. The response of stock
market prices and the exchange rate are measured in percent, the response of interest rates in percentage points. The
shaded areas give 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence intervals based on a block bootstrap algorithm.
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Figure E.2 — Robustness tests
(a) VAR with exogenous variables
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(b) VAR with four lags
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(c) Local projection with four lags
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(d) VAR with bootstrap block of 40 business days
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Notes: Estimated response for up to 10 business days to a 1 std. restrictive SNB Bill shock in black. The response of stock
market prices and the exchange rate are measured in percent, the response of interest rates in percentage points. The
shaded areas give 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence intervals based on a block bootstrap algorithm.
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Figure E.2 — Robustness tests (contd.)
(e) VAR with SPI
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(f) VAR with MSCI
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(g) VAR with overnight money market rate
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(h) VAR with bilateral exchange rates
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Notes: Estimated response for up to 10 business days to a 1 std. restrictive SNB Bill shock in black. The response of stock
market prices and the exchange rate are measured in percent, the response of interest rates in percentage points. The
shaded areas give 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence intervals based on a block bootstrap algorithm.
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Figure E.2 — Robustness tests (contd.)
(i) VAR without controlling for treasury bill auctions
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Notes: Estimated response for up to 10 business days to a 1 std. restrictive SNB Bill shock in black. The response of stock
market prices and the exchange rate are measured in percent, the response of interest rates in percentage points. The
shaded areas give 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence intervals based on a block bootstrap algorithm.
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